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Abstract: Nozick’s entitlement theory of justice has its major attempts to defend the 
institution of private property and to criticize the redistributive measures on the part of 
government. Nozick frowns at Rawls’ approach and the approach of welfare economics, 
which focused on evaluating only current time-slices of a distribution with no concern about 
the procedural aspects of justice. His notion of distributive justice has its anchorage on the 
account of what and how a given person is entitled to in virtue of what he has acquired and 
earned. While Rawls, whose position seems incompatible with that of Nozick holds a notion 
of justice on the account of the equality of the claims of each person in respect of basic needs 
and of the means to meet such needs. Nozick’s theory is a reaction against Rawls’ notion of 
distributive justice which he terms patterned, and of which he feels if upheld would 
consistently interfere with individual’s rights. This paper therefore argues that contrary to 
what Robert Nozick seems to suggest we do not see his theory as all satisfying nor any 
alternative, rather we are convinced that the inherent merits of his theory would suitably 
complement other patterned theories of distributive justice. This paper employed the 
expository method as well as critical analysis and prescriptive methods. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
The problem of distributive justice arises when one is required to distribute some 
social and economic benefits or burden to two or more people or group, among whom one is 
expected to decide how to distribute (Udoudom and Bassey, 111). For Ogunmodede, it 
governs the distribution of right and benefits that are owned the individual citizens by the 
states. (Ogunmodede, 404). For Nozick this problem is base on how the total product of joint 
social cooperation is to be divided up, (Nozick, 186) possibly to reflect what Pojman says 
about as “a constant and perpetual will togive everyman his due. (Pojman, 1997). It is this 
determinating factor and formula of what is due for every person that distinguishes Nozick's 
theory from Rawls and others like Aristotle, Karl Marx and David Hume. 
Our central focus in this paper would be to examine closely and critically the core 
elements of Nozick's entitlement theory, its shortcomings (if any) and challenges for us here 
in Nigeria. And contrary to neither what Nozick seems to suggest, we do neither see his theory 
as all-satisfying nor any alternative, rather are we convinced that the inherent merits of his 
theory would suitably complement other patterned theories of distributive justice. 
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JUSTICE IN HOLDING 
There are divergent views by different socio-political and economic philosophers on 
what constitutes a just holding. In his view, Hebert Spencer believes, that everyone has the 
freedom to put the earth to use to satisfy his wants, but provided that others are not restricted 
to do same. (Rosen, 1999). The only exception is with landed property which according to 
him if people acquire freely, would be left hi the hands of few land owners, who would make 
it difficult for some non-land owners to use. (196). 
Similarly, Locke argues that a man necessarily and legitimately becomes the owner of 
whatsoever he removes out of the state that nature provided and that he makes his property 
provided that he hath mixed his labour with it, and joined to it something that is his own". 
(190). And for Hegel a person has as his substantive end the right of putting his will into any 
and everything and thereby making it his". (194) 
Nozick's entitlement theory of justice shows that a correct theory of justice requires 
three parts which to him covers the subject of justice in holding. It is as follows: 
a. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principles of justice in 
acquisition is entitled to that holding. This is the theory of original acquisition which 
is concerned with how unowned things come to be legitimately owned in the first 
place. 
b. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in transfer 
is entitled to that holding. This is the theory of transfer which describes the conditions 
under which ownership of something is legitimately passed from one party to another. 
c. No one is entitled to a holding except by a respected application of ‘a’ and ‘b’. 
(Nozick 151). In other words, a distribution is just if it passes the just test procedure 
or process otherwise it would require rectification. 
A problem with this theory of acquisition is to ascertain how the first ‘transferee’ 
acquired in holding, obviously from a transferer. But how did this first transferer acquired 
what he transferred? To bridge this gap, Nozick follows John Locke who he interpreted, that, 
if a thing is not already held by someone else, it may justly be appropriated, but provided that 
it does not leave others worse. (Raphael, 1990). This he refers to as Lockean Proviso, which 
when violated with an appropriation must attract a compensation and without which the 
acquisition will be an illegitimate one. (Nozick 178). It is therefore this legitimately acquired 
holding that could be transferred to someone else and thereby conferring on the new 
“transferee” the entitlement right. 
It follows that a justifiable answer to the question why are you entitled to use that 
seashell as you wish? Will either be “I picked it up on the seashore, where it belonged to no 
one and where were plenty left for everyone else (a just act of original acquisition) or 
someone else picked it up at the seashore and freely sold or gave it to someone who freely 
sold or gave to me (a series of just acts of transfer). (Alasdar, 247-248). 
There are still major issues here begging for attention, first we cannot talk about 
appropriating anything that is unowned when almost nothing is unowned. (Varian 236). 
Second we wish to also ask if it really the case that any appropriation of an unowned property 
which does not leave anybody worse off could simply be regarded as just on that basis. There 
could be an instance where the individual's life does not worsen because, he does not lose 
anything that he has, but whose life is not improved because he is not able to appropriate what 
he could have appropriated because someone else was had appropriated the same unowned 
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property which could have improved his life. This same person, who is unable to appropriate, 
could further be denied any benefit from the things appropriated, especially when nothing is 
transferred to him by any means, since a particular individual reserves the right to transfer to 
whoever, whatever pleases him. It therefore goes to show that a legitimately acquired holding, 
could be transferred unjustly, and in fact be used to perpetrate injustice. It does not therefore 
follow that a transfer is just, since acquisition is just. 
Nozick is not unaware are of these very facts, that "not all situations are generated in 
accordance with the two principles of justice in holding”. (Nozick, 152). This situation could 
arise in cases of stealing, seizure of holdings or when others are forcibly excluded from 
competing in exchanges. (Nozick, 152). This would constitute unjust and illegitimate holdings 
and any transfer made would also be regarded so. To this he has the rectification principle 
which says that 'a past injustice is rectified, if its victims are raised to a level of well-being at 
least as high as they would have been at had the injustice never occurred” (Kavka, 377). It is 
his expectation that the perpetrators of injustice be obliged by the state or court to ensure that 
holdings are restored to the rightful owners which was unjustly taken from them. (Raphael 
151). 
But when we consider the historical fact that most property right held today can trace 
their lineage back to forceful (presumably illegitimate) appropriation, one wonders at the 
workability of Nozick's theory. Are we for instance expected to trace back the ownership of 
American land to the Indians and try to rectify the wrongful appropriation of it? (Varian 236). 
Inacknowledging this inherent problem with the rectification principle, Nozick asks "How far 
back must one go in wiping clean the historical state of injustice"? There is a familiar and 
classical example with Nigeria where corruption has become an entrenched means of 
acquisition, appropriation and transfer of holdings. (Oyeshile, 22) A country where it has been 
estimated that over a hundred billion dollars has been stolen and hidden in foreign banks by 
various Nigerian rulers, their families and acolytes. (Aluko, 2000). 
Let us imagine for the sake of emphasis a practical scenario in Nigeria where the 
President is in possession of billions of dollars appropriated unjustly from the late Head of 
State's loot, who had stolen from the country's treasury, a treasury over flowing with treasures 
unjustly earned by the country through or by the exploitation, dehumanization, animalization, 
pauperization, impoverishment and sometimes killing of the people, as we had in Odi. 
(Ujoma, 202). We need to further acknowledge the historical possibility, as we mentioned 
earlier, that these people currently occupying these oil rich regions of Nigeria might have 
settled there through an unjust process as it is with the case of America. To what extent can 
we rectify, how and where we begin to rectify this chronic and endemic generational injustice. 
There would definitely be a major problem of tracing these injustices; and where they could 
be traceable, this might continue ad infinitum. 
The situation becomes more complicated, questioning the essence of rectification 
principle, where for instance of perpetrators of slavery in America and their victims have 
benefited substantially through this unjust and inhumane treatment of humans. "For if slavery 
had never existed in America, the family trees of black families would have been different 
(than what they actually are) over many generations, and the existing individuals who are 
descendants of slaves would never have existed at all”. (Kavka, 278). In other words, they 
have suffered 'no harm' as a result of slavery, and are not owned any compensation or 
restitution according to the rectification principle. 
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While this may seems to assault the moral sense of justice of Africans, we must 
evaluate dispassionately and agree that the descendents of these slaves are comparatively 
better off in all ramifications, though slavery was unjust. The living white people who 
benefited from the injustices of slavery are not required to share these benefits with the heirs 
of the victims. (278). It would therefore imply that not every injustice perpetrated leaves 
people worse-off and if by this injustice, the people or victims are benefited, they would be no 
need for any form of rectification. Some have argued that this kind of conclusion brings to 
question seriously, the credibility of Nozick's theory of justice, in feet have asked for its total 
jettisoning. One is also left to wonder how to ascertain what this slaves and then-descendants 
would have been if never enslaved, and if rectification would have been very practicable, it 
becomes a problem to know how and where to reposition them back to. 
 
HISTORICAL AND CURRENT TIME-SLICE PRINCIPLE OF DISTRIBUTIVE 
JUSTICE 
The entitlement theory of justice is historical, which implies that a just distribution 
depends on how it came about, the past circumstances or actions of people determine the 
justifications of their holdings. It does not recognize or allow for a central body saddled with 
the responsibility to control resources and decide how they are to be doled out, rather, each 
person gets from others who give to him in exchange for something or as gift (153). 
The current tune-slice principles, also known as end-result or end-state principle is 
unhistorical and patterned. The principle holds that the justice of a distribution is determined 
by how things are distributed, (Brown Less, 1985) who ends up with what in terms of moral 
worth, needs, intelligence, or any other yardstick. (Nozick, 149). Nozick explains a patterned 
principle of distributive justice as one which 
Specifies that a distribution is to vary along with some natural 
dimensions, weighted sum of natural dimensions, or lexicographic 
ordering of naturals dimensions... it is pattered if is accords with 
some pattered principle. For example principle of distribution 
according to merit or principle of distribution to usefulness to society, 
distribution according to 1. Q. (Nozick, 156). 
 
Aristotle similarly holds that a process of give and take according to the right proportion must 
be done by diagonal conjunction and distribution tailored to recognize the inherent 
inequalities in humanity. David Hume believes in the impossibility and impracticability of 
perfect equality, and for him “distributive justice is contingent upon economic conditions and 
needs of man” (Ogunmodede, 403). Karl Marx would allow unequal rights rather than equal 
right to help level up the inherent inequalities in the society, based on the divers 
responsibilities of people. To this extent, the process would be pattered in such a way that 
what would be received from each person would be according to his abilities and according to 
needs, each person would be given. (Rosen & Wolff Eds. 232). 
Rawls in his two principles of justice holds that social and economic inequalities be 
arranged in such a way that they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of 
the society (Erin K. 2003). For Rawls, the distribution of wealth and income may not be equal 
but must be to everyone's advantages, especially the worse-off allowing inequalities. What 
would therefore constitute injustice is "inequalities that are not to the benefit of all”. (Rosen, 
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242). 
Nozick regards these theories as patterned and unhistorical, because they do not 
consider the past actions creating different entitlements to evaluate a distribution. Rather, 
requires only distributional matrices like I.Q. score and needs. (Nozick, 156). Nozick feels 
uncomfortable with such principles of distributive justice, claiming that is does not recognize 
the individual's right to choose to do, to make and what others choose to do him or give. 
(Brown L. 212). In expressing this view, Nozick holds that. 
Patterned distributional principles do not give people what 
entitlement principles do ... for they do not give the right to choose 
what to do with what one has, they do not give the right to pursue an 
end involving entitlement of another's position. (Nozick, 167). 
 
What Nozick has set out to do here is to give an unpatterned theory that would grant the 
individual the freedom and recognition of his right to give and receive as he wishes. Thus the 
maxim "from each as they choose, to each as they are chosen”. (167). 
While we have shown clearly how this exercise of freedom 
constitutes the theory's own undoing, it is still crucial to seek to know 
if the patterned and unhistorical principles of distributive justice do in 
any way deny the individual the right to choose to do whatever 
pleases him with his holding, it seem not. Rather we feel strongly that 
patterned distributive principles of justice are instrumental, useful and 
necessary for distribution, at a general level, which would involve the 
sharing of common wealth, natural cakes, and burdens which every 
members of a particular society is entitled to. This explains the 
adoption of sharing formula by the Nigerian government; thirteen 
percent derivation formula for the oil producing states to ensure 
equity and fairness. (167). 
 
The entitlement theory of justice has as its main concern to defend the institution of private 
property as its main concern and focus, the personal acquisition and transfer of holdings, inter 
personally. For instances, while the Federal Government would adopt a particular formula or 
yardstick to award scholarships or bursary award to students, the students who reserve the 
right to choose to do whatever pleases them with their share, do not need to adopt any formula 
in transferring their holdings to another person. Nozick's illustration with wilt chamberlain, 
with which he tries to upset pattern, becomes very instructive at this point. The individuals 
who were excited about seeming him play," gave their twenty-five cents each from their 
personal possession (which they may have acquired by appropriating an unowned property or 
from a transferred holding, or from their share of the national cake distributed to them as 
citizens) thereby making chamberlain entitled to this income. No one, not even the other 
players would cry for injustice, this is because the spectators gave and operated under 
Nozick's theory. 
We also wish to state further that the justification of chamberlain's entitlement "new 
distribution D2," though may not be in question, but when we apply Nozick's theory strictly, 
its justification would depend on who gave or transferred what. The assumptionby Nozick that 
all who gave to chamberlain acquired their money legitimately is very unlikely. Chamberlain 
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would therefore not be entitled to the monies given to him by armed-robbers, drug barons, 
dupes, etc. and even the stadium authority (private or government) would lose their 
entitlement rights of such money. 
While it seems bizarre and absurd, to say that one who has worked for a criminal 
(known or unknown), is not entitled to his income, a strict application of this theory would 
definitely have a way to checkmate criminality and injustice, prevent people from receiving, 
accepting and even soliciting for cash gifts, gifts and other forms of assistance form people in 
the society know to have ill-gotten wealth. Besides, we are also convinced that an outright 
criminalization of such holdings would be effective rectification and deterrence. 
However, it is clear that Nozick's attempt to upset patterened distributive justice 
seems defeated. This is because his theory has a structural pattern which according to him 
must be followed and observed for any conferment of entitlement right on anybody. What he 
has succeeded in showing as we shall see in the next session of this paper, is how the outcome 
of some distributive principles of justice could be obstructed. 
 
NOZICK AND SOCIALISM 
Nozick's postulations question the possibility of achieving egalitarianism; through the 
adoption of a patterned distributional principle. People as he observes, seek to work overtime 
in a society where it is assumed that their needs are satisfied because perhaps, they care more 
about things other than needs. Noizick therefore asks 
On what basis could the inequalities that could eventuate be 
forbidden ,„? No end-state principle or distributional patterned 
principle of justice can be continuously realized without continuous 
interference with people's lives... To maintain a pattern one must 
either continually interfere to stop people from transferring resources 
as they wish to, or continually (or periodically) interfere to take from 
some person's resources that other for some reason choose to transfer 
to them...Any distributional pattern with egalitarian component is 
overtunable by voluntary actions of individual persons over time 
(Nozick, 167). 
 
It is pellucid and we agree with Nozick that the Marxian concept of distributional principle of 
justice which has an egalitarian component would fail with people's voluntary actions to give 
and receive resources and holdings. But neither the Aristoteliantheory of distributive justice 
which is relativistic nor the Rawlsian postulation which is teleological and utilitarian would 
suffer the same fate. 
Nozick has been criticized for not having provision for equality and the 
underprivileged in his entitlement conception of justice. There is a central assumption that the 
individual's right is inviolable. So to him as Brown explains "... what the state can properly do 
is not to ease the burden of the economically and socially disadvantaged, but to protect all 
individuals from such tilings as killing or physical harm, destruction or seizure of property or 
deprivation of personal liberty". (Brown Lee, 212-213). 
We do not regard Nozick's position as faulty, that there is bound to be inequalities as a 
result of individual's freedom and ability to acquire holdings, without in fringing on the right 
of others. Everyone deserves his due reward for his labour; to each according to their ability. 
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Though it has been argued in some quarters that we are not equally endowed, and that 
empirical research has show that people do not have equal opportunity in the competition of 
resources. (Brown Lee, 212-213). Les Brown therefore feels that"... our assumption on justice, 
founded on the formal notion of justice as fairness in the treatment of persons are not shared 
by Nozick." (Brown Lee, 212-213). 
The question that we must pose back to brown is, "what is fair about depriving others 
their possession through taxation and other means, for the sake of those that have not probably 
made any or same effort as their so called privileged counterparts"? Would it not rather be 
considered more as fairness, if efforts are made to ensure that everyone is given equal 
opportunity? Or how would you explain or phantom an explanation of the phenomenon in 
some parts of the Northern Nigeria where some of our brother have failed to take advantage of 
the quota system of the Federal Government in education even when some of them are paid 
salaries as medical students? 
 
CONCLUSION 
Given this equal opportunity, and eschewing unnecessary sentiment and sympathy 
which makes people unproductive, a system of taxation could be adopted based on the 
principle of "the less you earn, the more you pay". The idea is that this would at long run 
make more richer-men than poorer men. 
In this spirit of equality the Igbos would say "egbe bere ugo bere, nke si ibe ya ebela, 
nku kwa ya" (let the hawk perch, let the eagle perch, anyone that refuses the other from 
perching, let the wings be broken). In this same vein, Ujomu has observed that the presence 
and operation of some core social values such as trust, justice, honesty, and love among 
different interests and segments of the society, would ensure that Nigeria achieves sustainable 
development, sanity, peace and prosperity. (Ujomu, 205). 
A responsive and responsible governance which would manage our resources to 
rational ends. (Okoye, 2003) would further help build and reclaim the already eroded trust of 
the people on the government A recognition of their right and opportunities to have the joy of 
life, which includes materials and non-material possessions. No nation would survive with her 
citizenry walking under the label of "Odi ndu onwu ka mma" (the walking dead). 
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